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The story of Brazil’s engagement in Africa is not necessarily novel, but its 
security activities on the continent still are. Often presented as by-products 
of the new South–South relations, they have resulted in substantial inroads 
towards the increased security capacity of several key countries. However, 
economic constraints, an unpredictable political context back home, and 
previously existing structural fragilities have led to a new, bleaker outlook 
for Brazil’s position in Africa.
 • The last decade has seen Brazil adopt an expansive security agenda towards 
Africa that has preferentially targeted South Atlantic countries and built upon 
offers of military training, technical-scientific assistance, and private–public 
investments in defence hardware.
 • This engagement is now showing signs of strain, with potential consequences 
for Brazil’s aim of becoming an alternative security provider on the continent.
 • This strain is a direct reflection of the current economic climate in Brazil, a new 
policy orientation on the part of the government that signals a detachment from 
issues of the Global South, and operational shortcomings that are curtailing 
cooperation initiatives.
 • Possible scenarios for Brazil range from continuing to disengage from security 
issues in Africa, attempting to manage the bulk of previous endeavours, or de-
pending on partnerships to mitigate a potentially broader cooperation cutback.
Policy Implications
In the context of increased engagement by rising powers in Africa, any retrench-
ment of cooperation initiatives will likely impair Brazil’s position as a security 
partner on the continent. This limitation could potentially be counterbalanced by 
increasing the coordination of efforts with other bilateral or multilateral actors.
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Brazil as a New Security Player in Africa
Midway through Lula da Silva’s tenure (2003–2010), Brazil’s profile as an external 
security actor started to change. Whereas the country’s external engagements had 
previously been limited in scope and ambition, new international responsibilities 
began to be inscribed more decisively in the country’s foreign dealings, together 
with a more proactive stance towards the outside world. Brazil’s leadership of the 
MINUSTAH mission in Haiti comprised the most well-known example as it entailed 
the single largest Brazilian military contribution abroad since World War II. But 
even though it required different policy tools and received less public attention, 
Africa also began to attract renewed Brazilian interest with respect to the capacity-
building needs of local security sectors as well as shared security developments in 
the maritime space in-between.
The bulk of Brazil’s efforts in Africa followed a preferential South Atlantic geo-
graphic demarcation in line with the official intent of fostering a regional conscious-
ness around common security perceptions (Abdenur and Souza Neto 2014). That 
much was made clear in Brazilian defence guidelines such as the National Defence 
Policy, the National Defence Strategy, and the Defence White Book, which called 
for increased attention to West and Southern African countries as worthy part-
ners in Brazil’s immediate strategic surroundings. In time, this approach was also 
 coupled with heavy criticism of Northern involvement in South Atlantic issues and 
external interventions in African hotspots such as Libya and Mali as Brazil aimed to 
secure a larger autonomous role of its own.
Three specific traits contributed to adding substance to Brazil’s efforts and sus-
taining their implementation across the Atlantic. The first was Brazil’s ability to 
replicate good practices and build upon prior successes in the security cooperation 
domain. Drawing on lessons gained through the naval training operation in Na-
mibia from 1994 onwards (Seabra 2016), a new Brazilian naval support mission was 
opened in Cape Verde in 2014, followed a year later by a skeleton crew in São Tomé 
and Príncipe. Both endeavours proved small and flexible enough to not only gener-
ate concrete reputational results, but also promote further long-term contacts be-
tween the respective armed forces. The fact that these new missions were combined 
with a considerable increase in the provision of training opportunities for African 
military personnel in Brazilian military institutions – as overseen by the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC) – further heightened 
Brazil’s assistance profile.
A second trait of Brazilian cooperation involved the convergence of security co-
operation initiatives with more technical-scientific assistance. The balance between 
harder and softer security dimensions became particularly clear in Brazil’s support 
for the mapping and delimitation of several African countries’ continental plat-
forms, including Angola’s and Namibia’s, through Brazilian state-owned  Empresa 
Gerencial de Projetos Navais (EMGEPRON). By tailoring its approach to the needs 
of each partner, Brazil was able to respond to a concrete technical demand and 
provide such countries with much-needed scientific expertise. All this while also re-
inforcing such countries’ own legal claims to the surrounding waters and rebuffing 
third parties’ interest in the underwater mineral wealth.
In addition to these activities, close institutional collaboration between differ-
ent Brazilian officials was equally evident. Unprecedented interactions between the 
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Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (also known as Itamaraty) and the Ministry 
of Defence, together with the different branches of the Armed Forces, were effective-
ly translated into support for new private–public ventures at the industrial- defence 
level. The air-to-air A-DARTER missile project with South Africa, in particular, 
proved to be the prime example of these dynamics. However, private-sector-led 
conglomerates such as Odebrecht, OAS and Camargo Corrêa also began to acquire 
or create defence subsidiaries in order to take advantage of the federal incentives 
to revamp Brazil’s defence industry, while also actively assessing new opportunities 
in African markets. 
Nevertheless, as predominant as it might have been in Brazilian official calcula-
tions, the emphasis on the South Atlantic did not preclude other significant engage-
ments across the continent. North African countries, for instance, remained impor-
tant destinations for Brazilian weaponry, specifically small arms and ammunitions 
(Muggah and Thompson 2016). Likewise, Mauritania and Mali received consid-
erable official accolades as they became key markets for Brazilian-made Embraer 
military airplanes, while Mozambique also retained privileged bilateral military 
ties due to historical-cultural affinities. Meanwhile, Brazil’s footprint on the ground 
grew larger through an expanded network of defence attachés. This network was, 
in turn, supplemented by a series of defence cooperation agreements that Brazil 
signed between 2003 and 2014 with countries such as Angola, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, 
and South Africa (Seabra 2014).
These bilateral efforts were pursued in tandem with greater investment in mul-
tilateral frameworks. The revitalisation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the 
South Atlantic (Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul, ZOPACAS) took centre 
stage, as it enshrined a conceptualisation of the ocean in between that suited the 
official rhetoric of shared South–South security perceptions (Abdenur et al. 2016). 
But the defence component of the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking 
Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) and the interna-
tional pulpit of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) received similar Brazil-
ian interest, because they entailed close ties with the country’s African Lusophone 
counterparts. Continental organisations such as the African Union (AU) were tar-
geted as well, with Brazil contributing to the design of the AU’s Integrated Maritime 
Strategy 2050 by means of a permanent defence attaché stationed in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. All in all, by 2014 and after just a few years of active engagement, Brazil 
had managed to consolidate itself as a noteworthy security partner.
Mixed Signals and Growing Competition
The last two years, however, have seen significant changes in Brazil that have had 
an inescapable impact on its external relations. In this context, and despite the 
unparalleled level of interaction with the African continent during the last decade, 
recent developments have created mixed messages regarding the sustainability of 
Brazil’s role as a security actor in Africa. Lingering attempts to capitalise on prior 
gains with these countries can still be identified, though they have been limited. 
Brazil’s triad of strategic documents, for example, is on course to undergo the re-
vision originally foreseen to take place every four years. All three sets of strategic 
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guidelines mentioned above are expected to be approved by Congress before year’s 
end and will include new dispositions that not only reaffirm previous geographic 
emphases regarding a South Atlantic cooperation drive but also call for greater for-
eign policy and defence policy intersections at the highest federal levels. Addition-
ally, a new defence cooperation agreement was signed with Cape Verde in October 
2016. The agreement updated the previous one from 1994 and included the country 
in the roster of African partners that follow the same formal dispositions in this 
kind of initiative.
However, this narrative of continuity can be called into question by early evi-
dence of declining engagement. This evidence includes, for instance, the volte-face 
regarding the long-planned donation of Brazilian T-27 Tucano training aircraft to 
Mozambique. First announced back in 2009, at the height of Brazil’s engagement 
with the continent, the process was originally supposed to include the training of 
 local technical support teams in order to open up a new market niche for further 
purchases of Embraer airplanes down the line. However, that donation was official-
ly reversed in September 2016 as it was reportedly viewed as impacting the opera-
tional capabilities of the Brazilian Air Force, which decided it was not willing to let 
go of what was initially extra military hardware after all. The foreseeable cutbacks 
in Brazilian military re-equipment programmes due to the present economic cli-
mate were apparently taken into consideration here.
A second noteworthy episode concerned the single largest overseas deal for the 
Brazilian naval industry in recent years. After a protracted competing tender process, 
in 2014 Brazil secured a key position in Angola’s plans to re-equip its navy. For an 
estimated cost of USD 170 million, the construction of seven 500t Macaé-class patrol 
vessels was formalised, with the first four to be built in Brazil and the remaining 
three in Angola, in a new local shipyard also included in the deal. Moreover, Brazil 
committed itself to provide the training and qualifications that the Angolan Navy 
personnel would need to operate and maintain the acquired vessels. By early 2016, 
however, the lauded deal was considered to have broken down entirely due to Brazil-
ian shipyards’ lack of logistical capacity to fulfil the agreed-upon delivery timeline. In 
light of this, Angola has opted to move on and pursue other external bidders.
Additional worrisome signs can be found in other examples of bureaucratic in-
action. The creation of a new defence attaché post in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), for example, remains illusory, despite repeated statements to the 
contrary by Brazilian officials back in 2013. [1] Furthermore, negotiations for a de-
fence cooperation agreement with Ghana have also been stalled since 2010, with 
no meaningful progress in sight. Finally, Brazil’s naval operation in São Tomé and 
Príncipe, which has been in charge of training local marines, has yet to be elevated 
to full mission status like the mission in Cape Verde, as envisioned back in 2015 by 
Brazil’s own navy officers. 
Taken together, this lack of progress in domains previously considered the 
linchpins of Brazil’s approach to Africa warrants some concern for the country’s 
level of engagement in the coming years – and even more so given the growing 
competition with other rising powers for the same cooperation opportunities in 
Africa. The case of Namibia serves as an example. Despite a 22-year-old military 
partnership with Brazil and the expectation that this would translate into new naval 
opportunities for the Brazilian defence industry, Namibian authorities contracted a 
Chinese company as an alternative hardware supplier in 2012. Since then, rumours 
1  The announcement 
was originally tied to  
Brazilian General Carlos 
dos Santos Cruz’s com-
mand of the MONUSCO 
mission in the country 
between 2013 and 2015. 
After his departure, official 
interest in the attaché post 
declined accordingly.
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have swirled regarding the possible installation of a permanent Chinese base in the 
Namibian port of Walvis Bay. Even though such reports have been officially denied, 
they have enhanced the sense of other countries’ growing competition with Brazil 
for similar roles as privileged cooperation partners.
Economic, Political, and Operational Constraints
After over 10 years of expansion, the Brazilian model of security cooperation abroad 
is evidencing signs of strain that are taking their toll on the effectiveness of coopera-
tion projects and on the country’s broader capacity as a key partner in this domain. 
The main causes can be found in Brazil’s own internal woes, which have impeded 
long-term planning, the necessary allocation of resources, and the political support 
needed to proceed with such cooperation initiatives. Three blockade forces can be 
singled out.
The first derives from the current economic climate in Brazil, which has sig-
nificantly dampened national growth expectations. The ongoing recession, which is 
expected to top 3 per cent in 2016 alone, will likely carry through until 2017, with evi-
dent ripple effects for Brazil’s economic outlook. The most immediate consequences 
will be felt at the budgetary level, within each and every ministry and governmental 
agency. Itamaraty, the ABC, the Ministry of Defence, and the Armed Forces will not 
be exempt from the upcoming austerity drive. Already facing steep cutbacks since 
2014, the ABC has been hit the hardest, with available resources for cooperation 
projects in Africa estimated to have fallen by 25 per cent between 2012 and 2015 
(Mello 2015). However, the impact of the crisis will also be felt in terms of export 
funding lines, which were previously made available by the Brazilian Development 
Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES) as part of 
a broad political mandate to increase its focus on Africa. Less public support will, 
in turn, hamper the planned engagement of Brazilian defence companies across the 
Atlantic. Much of this activity has now been put on hold due to the present economic 
uncertainty. [2]
A second hurdle to broader dealings with Africa resides at the heart of Brazil’s 
own political class. The tumultuous process of Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment and 
the subsequent swearing-in of Michel Temer as the new president triggered an un-
predictable new cycle in Brazilian politics. A new foreign-policy orientation with 
less of a focus on South–South relations (Mello 2016) is unlikely to make room 
for niche cooperation initiatives with African countries. On top of these changes, 
a revolving door in terms of key posts has also caused many initiatives previously 
approved or announced to come to a standstill. The previous leadership of Celso 
Amorim at the helm of the Ministry of Defence (2011–2014) successfully built upon 
his prior stint leading Itamaraty (2003–2010) and contributed to expanding the 
profile of the country’s external defence overtures. This continuity stands in con-
trast, however, with the latest influx of leadership. All in all, Brazil has witnessed 
three different defence ministers (Jacques Wagner, Aldo Rebelo, and Raul Jung-
mann) in two years alone, coupled with three different external relations minis-
ters (Luís Alberto Figueiredo, Mauro Vieira, and José Serra) during the last three 
years. The concurrent impact on each ministry’s bureaucratic apparatus has been 
significant. Likewise, the fact that every defence cooperation agreement signed with 
2 The fact that the higher 
echelons of such firms 
have been caught in the 
comprehensive national 
anti-corruption drive Car 
Wash (Lava Jato) – which 
has uncovered widespread 
political kickbacks in 
exchange for preferential 
public tenders – has also 
impacted these expansion 
plans.
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African countries in the last decade remains stuck in Congress waiting for final legal 
ratification further attests to the present dichotomy of priorities between Brazil’s 
different branches of power.  
A third blockade force goes beyond conjectural economic and political factors 
and can be found instead in the structural fragilities within the operational model 
put into place across different institutions and ministries. The provision of training 
opportunities for African militaries provides a good example. In light of growing 
African demand, the Ministry of Defence and the ABC had started collaborating on 
a new oversight framework for foreign military training programmes, which was 
formalised in 2010. But despite these institutional advancements, the Namibian 
mission still remains under the direct purview of the Brazilian Navy. This has pre-
vented an overall cohesiveness of operations and has dispersed the intended chain 
of command. Irregular funding comprises yet another issue. Given the lack of an 
overarching legal framework to directly transfer resources abroad, the ABC is still 
forced to resort to occasional financial transfers through the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) office in Brazil and back to the ABC itself in order to 
maintain such initiatives, including those in the defence area. This raises questions 
of transparency and predictability regarding the overall cooperation drive. Finally, 
the Brazilian approach to Africa has met with its share of setbacks. The difficult 
experience of trying to implement a technical-military mission in Guinea-Bissau at-
tests to this, as do the repeatedly delayed ATLANTIC TIDINGS joint naval exercises 
with Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. [3] In both cases, the willingness to devise 
new modes of engagement with African partners was subsequently undermined by 
contingencies and obstacles that could have been prevented with more fine-tuned 
assessments of local geopolitical sensitivities. 
Latent Detachment, Business as Usual, or Branching Out? 
Bearing in mind the present context and the existing fragilities at the core of Brazil’s 
outwards approach, any additional signs of disengagement will likely undermine 
Brazil’s previous gains in Africa as a rising security provider and will raise questions 
about its commitment to the capacitation of local security sectors. Accordingly, 
three prospective scenarios based on three different approaches can be explored, 
each of which would have important ramifications for the sustainability of Brazil’s 
transatlantic initiatives.
 • The first scenario would entail a further deepening of Brazil’s retrenchment of 
African security issues in the short term. If Brazilian officials opt to go down that 
road, it will likely translate into more concrete and immediate steps, such as a 
steep reduction in regular bilateral consultations between defence ministries 
in order to focus on other external priorities, the scaling down of the defence 
attaché network and military exercises in order to meet budgetary constraints, 
or the defunding of wider multilateral regional initiatives such as ZOPACAS. 
This set of decisions would, in turn, kick-start Brazil’s significantly diminished 
engagement in Africa and tarnish the goodwill acquired across the continent. 
Private defence industry players would still continue to look to African markets 
with some interest, possibly following the lead of Brazilian small arms manu-
facturers. But the on-the-ground knowledge obtained in recent years would 
3 Such exercises also 
originally included the 
DRC, but after preliminary 
discussions, the country 
dropped out of the oper-
ational planning.
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probably decrease. It can also be expected that external actors such as China 
would seek to fill the void in an even more prominent fashion, while trying to 
supplement Brazil’s cutbacks. Given the present economic climate and the fact 
that new elections will only take place in 2018, thus delaying any significant 
political volte-face in this domain, such a scenario is not entirely unlikely.
 • A second potential scenario would involve Brazil taking the middle ground and 
focusing on the management of expectations across the continent as well as on 
the low-key maintenance of existing activities. Flagship programmes (e.g. the 
naval mission in Namibia) would endure because they would remain shielded 
from the main austerity drive, while continuing to serve as an example of what 
Brazil can ideally provide in Africa. Meanwhile, Lusophone countries would 
likely receive the bulk of official investment inasmuch as Brazil would continue 
to participate in the CPLP’s defence configuration, without over-committing 
to any new grand initiative. Other endeavours launched in recent years, how-
ever, would become harder to follow through as available resources will likely 
dwindle due to the focus of the present administration in Brasília on other geo-
graphic settings. Leading airplane manufacturer Embraer would still be able 
to close some pending deals, but further offers of technical cooperation on the 
part of EMGEPRON would only be pursued on a case-by-case basis, and upon 
payment of an appropriate fee. This scenario would grant a sense of normalcy 
to Brazilian interactions with Africa, but it would still remain at odds with the 
notion of business as usual.
 • A third scenario would see the shaking of Brazil’s approach to its core. Namely, 
it would see the country consider more seriously the triangulation of efforts 
with other individual and multilateral actors in Africa. This is far from being 
a novelty: in 2012, possible joint initiatives in Africa with the US government 
were discussed as part of the Defence Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) framework 
(The White House 2012). That bilateral pipe dream, however, never came to 
fruition. But if new activities were to be exempted from stringent Western-led 
conations and ownership labels, it is possible Brazil could find enough room to 
overcome its own former opposition, thus mitigating the fallout of the current 
economic climate for its cooperation initiatives. Even though the recent change 
of office in Washington DC is not particularly auspicious, a useful barometer 
for an evolution in Brazil’s predisposition towards such partnerships could still 
be found in the country’s decision to decrease, maintain, or reinforce its par-
ticipation in the annual US-led Obangame Express naval exercise in the Gulf of 
Guinea. A similar rationale could also apply to increased operational support 
for other multilateral missions led by the UN or the European Union in Africa. 
This would prove an appealing choice as it would cement the country’s multi-
lateral credentials. The odds of its implementation, however, are also limited, 
as it would run counter to the Brazilian military’s objections in recent years that 
it does not possess the capabilities to contribute a more significant number of 
troops for peacekeeping missions in Africa (Kenkel 2013).
Each prospective option is grounded in Brazil’s previous track record, but none ful-
ly addresses the country’s problems or entirely complements its shortcomings. An 
overall diagnosis of Brazil’s future security relations with Africa that ranges from a 
worst-case, to a middle-ground, to a branch-out-type scenario could thus lead to a 
combination of different features as the more likely outcome. Given the Itamaraty’s 
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current lack of political appetite for international security issues, it will probably be 
left to the Ministry of Defence and its own internal bureaucratic structure to try and 
preserve the bulk of cooperation initiatives abroad. Likewise, some pushback from 
military authorities in order to salvage the reputational gains obtained in Africa in 
recent years can be expected.
Broader Implications for Brazil’s Security Cooperation  
with Africa
The Brazilian defence cooperation model in Africa appears to be nearing a water-
shed moment. Still, as fluid as the current situation may be, it also presents a chal-
lenge to the remaining international community in terms of how best to respond to 
such developments and how best to engage with Brazil in this particular domain. 
An advisable course of action should therefore build upon two complementary ap-
proaches.
The first (1) involves recognising that African countries chose to partner with 
Brazil for a reason – namely, because Brazil had something to offer and addressed 
their concrete capacity-building needs. Whether maritime technical expertise or 
specific military training, certain niche areas were evidently not covered by tradi-
tional security suppliers, thus causing African countries to look elsewhere. Over-
looking the intricacies of these supply-and-demand dynamics will ultimately prove 
counterproductive if the goal is to provide any new assistance. The second approach 
(2) involves acknowledging the long-standing presence of Brazil in Africa while also 
understanding why its past experiences with capacity-building on the ground, such 
as the training of Namibia’s Navy, have successfully endured over the years. Al-
though still not well known, Southern-led initiatives have existed for a while now 
and are increasingly competing for the same space as Western ventures. To expli-
citly ignore their inroads only adds fuel to the rhetorical divide that has permeated 
many external engagements with Africa. Perhaps more problematic, it defeats the 
purpose of capacitating local security sectors in an efficient fashion and of address-
ing shared security conundrums. Increased coordination between existing coopera-
tion approaches would therefore allow such goals to be met more effectively.
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